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1. The debate 
 
In September 2018, after a summer-long campaign promoted by grassroots activists on the left of the 
UK Labour Party, the party’s annual general conference discussed a series of measures that would give 
ordinary members greater say on the mechanisms of selection and recall of party representatives in 
Parliament. The proposals ranged from lowering the threshold of members needed to trigger votes of 
deselection for sitting MPs, to the suggestion of open contests for selecting candidates at each General 
Election. The measures were the subject of heated debate among members, union representatives, 
campaign groups, party officials and policy advisors, and in the end only a handful were approved.  
Some party officials emphasised the potentially “destabilising” nature of the proposals, mindful of the 
risk of distracting elected MPs from the seemingly more important task of challenging the Tory 
government.1 Others warned of “catastrophic consequences” for securing the commitment of floating 
voters if the more ambitious measures of mandatory reselection were to pass.2 For those on the 
opposite side of the debate, the measures were intended to enable greater participation in politics by 
ordinary people, thus raising democratic accountability. As one Labour MP argued, “only by 
empowering grassroots members can Labour remain the party that does politics with the community 
rather than to it”.3  
One way to read this debate, as much of the British press did at the time, is as an instance of petty 
fighting between rival groups in the party, revealing the divide between a more institutionally-
oriented and allegedly responsible centre versus recently affiliated, more radical members committed 
to the purity of principles.  Following the election of Jeremy Corbyn as party leader in summer 2015 
and re-election in 2016, and the corresponding expansion of Labour’s membership, intra-party 
tensions became apparent on several questions.  Disputes about the appropriate organisational form 
of the party might be seen in this sense as just extensions of a wider schism – a proxy war for more 
substantive disputes about how to interpret the meaning of democratic socialism, and how to 
evaluate the pre-Corbyn ‘New Labour’ era.  
But this would be reductive. The debate on mandatory reselection and the controversy that 
surrounded it raised questions of self-standing importance.  Examining them takes us beyond matters 
of parliamentary tactics and strategy into the heart of debates about the nature of democracy, the 
relationship between representation and self-government, and the contribution of partisanship to it.  







They are worth looking at in more detail also because the UK Labour Party has by no means been the 
only contemporary party to engage with them.  Those that have emerged in Europe around a critique 
of mediation, seeking technological ways to make office-holders more responsive to a wider 
movement and developing mechanisms of deselection to underpin them, are testament like Labour’s 
experiences to the relevance of questions of representation, participation and recall. 4  Parties such as 
Podemos, La France Insoumise and Movimento 5 Stelle, sometimes referred to as a new breed of 
“digital party”, have experimented with demanding new mechanisms by which to keep office-holders 
in line, expelling MPs and Senators in the process.5  However mixed their success as democratic 
innovations so far, and however much they depart from their principles once in government (as may 
be the case with Movimento 5 Stelle), such experiments carry wider resonance and are apt to be 
copied elsewhere.   
The paper starts by reconstructing what is at stake in the contrast between representative and direct 
democracy in relation to the problem of self-government. It then explores the case of recalling 
representatives as an instance of democratic partisanship that may usefully bridge the divide between 
representative and direct mechanisms of popular participation. It goes on to discuss some problems 
related to the recall of representatives in liberal democracy, before suggesting possible answers and 
responding to possible criticisms.  The basic point we make Is that issues around the ethics of recalling 
representatives provide an important basis for exploring how a particular conception of partisanship 
(which we have elsewhere called the democratic conception)6 can help mediate some of the tensions 
between representative institutions and direct democracy. 
Before proceeding with the main argument, one clarification is in order. The practices of 
representative recall, like those of initiative and referendum, are often analysed under the rubric of 
direct-democratic measures designed to empower ordinary citizens by enabling them to influence 
government. Through these measures, the wider public can exercise control over particular decisions 
(for example by making new proposals for legislation or by voting in plebiscites) or over particular 
individuals (by filing petitions to remove particular officials from their position in public office). Our 
focus in this paper is related but narrower. Since there is by now a small but relevant literature on the 
issues of initiative, referendum and recall in their connection to direct democracy more generally,7 
our topic is the more limited but as yet underexplored one of recall mechanisms within parties.8 
Analysing the role of recall mechanisms as they relate to the distinctive ethics of partisanship goes to 
the heart of the relationship between representative institutions and democratic participation. It 
raises questions that are different in focus from those that arise in the ethics of direct democracy more 
generally. Although, as we shall shortly see, some of the tensions we explore also apply to other 
mechanisms of direct democracy, focusing on the particular practice of recall from within partisanship 
                                                          
4 Urbinati, Nadia “Revolt against Intermediary Bodies”, Constellations vol. 22 (4) (2015), pp. 1-10. 
5 Gerbaudo, Paolo, The Digital Party: Political Organisation and Online Democracy (London: Pluto, 2019), p.10, 
p.88. 
6 See White, Jonathan, and Lea Ypi, The Meaning of Partisanship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp.2-7. 
7 See the discussion in Cronin, Thomas E., Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). See also Altman, David, Direct Democracy Worldwide 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
8 For one exception, emphasising also the wider use of these mechanisms at local level, see Bowler, Shaun, "Recall 
and Representation Arnold Schwarzenegger Meets Edmund Burke," Representation 40, no. 3 (2004), 200-12. 
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2. Representation and self-government 
 
The value of self-government in political relations was succinctly summarised by Rousseau in one of 
the canonical formulations of the challenge of the social contract: how to find “a form of association 
that will defend and protect the person and goods of each associate with the full common force, and 
by means of which each, uniting with all, nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before 
”.10 In everyday political talk, democracy and self-government are often equated.  Democracy is 
understood as a form of rule by the people which satisfies the promise of self-government by giving 
people an equal say on decisions that matter to them.11 Of course how exactly to understand what an 
equal say requires is complicated. But regardless of those complications, it pays to emphasise that the 
relationship between democracy and self-government in the Rousseauian formulation is much more 
demanding than we often assume, and possibly also different from its realisation in most 
contemporary liberal institutions. Let us explain. 
Democracy in virtually all liberal societies is not so much self-rule as rule by representatives. One of 
the most essential features of a representative system is the division of labour between 
representatives and represented. The central institution in such a system is the election of 
representatives at regular intervals. On this depends both the composition of government and the 
degree of correspondence between the wishes of the electorate and the decisions of representatives. 
Although governmental decisions are part of public debate and representatives may reflect the will of 
the majority of their constituents, they also retain a significant degree of independence.12  
But if the division of labour between representatives and represented is part and parcel of democracy 
as currently understood, to what extent do those who unite with others to submit to the power of 
laws remain “as free as before”? If representatives are allowed to make decisions on behalf of the 
represented while also retaining their own independence, it is clear that the degree to which political 
institutions allow individuals to remain free, thus realising the value of self-government, depends on 
the degree to which the will of the represented is actually reflected in the will of representatives.  
The founding fathers of representative institutions would have been surprised to hear the phrase 
representative democracy as we currently employ it. When representative institutions were first 
theorised, in the context of the American and French Revolutions, its champions did not think of 
democracy and representative government as complements as much as opposites. For people like 
Siéyès and Madison, the very point of representative government was to limit the direct influence of 
ordinary people on politics for fear that the ignorance of the masses would sway important decisions 
                                                          
9 Here we use the terms self-government, self-mastery and non-domination as synonymous. What is at stake in 
the democratic tradition is not being subject to the will of another and the extent to which collective political 
institutions enable this. 
10 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, "Of the Social Contract." in The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, 
edited by Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1762] 1997), pp. 39-161, at p. 50. 
11 See for a summary of most contemporary definitions see Christiano, Tom, "Democracy", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/democracy/>. 
12 Manin, Bernard, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
p. 6. 
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in a direction that might threaten the common good. Madison straightforwardly emphasised this 
when he argued that one of the reasons for preferring rule through representatives over rule by the 
people was to “to refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen 
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country”.13  
While less concerned with the skills of representatives, Siéyès also believed that a representative 
system was the method of government most appropriate to the needs of commercial society.  The 
mass of people should be left free to attend to their private business while leaving it to professional 
politicians to coordinate their common affairs. Indeed, for other advocates of representation, like 
Constant, this was one of the main differences between the freedom of the ancients, where all 
members of the political community were required to have a say and the individual was subjected to 
the collective authority of the political community, and the freedom of the moderns, where delegating 
decisions to representatives liberated individuals from collective responsibilities while enabling them 
to realise their private goals.14  
Needless to say, for direct democrats inspired by Rousseau, these were the very reasons to be 
suspicious of the idea that representative institutions could at all realise people’s freedom. The divide 
between ordinary people and politicians (or what Weber would later call the divide between 
occasional and professional politicians15) implied that the skills required to govern would become 
increasingly specialised and that ordinary people, including those with less education, less ability to 
navigate a complex system of decision-making and fewer rhetorical tools, would remain alienated 
from both their representatives and from representative institutions.  
Moreover, the very rhythms of representative politics implied that the will of the people could easily 
be ignored at all but election time. As Rousseau put it when discussing the nature of representation 
in England, “the English people thinks it is free: it is greatly mistaken, it is free only during the election 
of Members of Parliament; as soon as they are elected it is enslaved, it is nothing”.16 Under these 
circumstances, representative democracy could do anything but realise the value of self-government. 
Far from remaining as free as before, those who delegated their right to rule to select representatives, 
ran the risk of suffering the consequences of decisions made by a few elites that they could not control. 
In an effort to ensure that continuous links between representatives and the represented were 
maintained, radical democrats came up with a number of proposals, pioneered by the Jacobins in the 
French National Assembly of 1789, integrated in the radical democratic movements of 1848 and 
picked up by socialist campaigners in the late 19th and 20th centuries. They included measures such as 
the imperative mandate, rotation in office, the abolition of a permanent bureaucratic class, the de-
professionalisation of the executive, and many others. They were all designed to remove the 
boundaries between representatives and the represented either by abolishing the distinction or by 
ensuring that the decisions of the former remained accountable to the latter at all points. As one 
radical member of the French National Assembly put it during the debates around the imperative 
                                                          
13 Madison, "Federalist 10," in Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and Isaac Kramnick, The Federalist 
Papers (Harmondsworth: Penguin, [1788] 1987), pp. 82. In discussing this passage Manin rightly notes that “a 
chosen body of citizens” here indicates both the fact that representatives were chosen (as in elected by the 
people) but also the fact that they were distinguished and eminent individuals, see Manin, Principles of 
Representative Government, p. 2.  
14Constant, Benjamin, "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns." in Political Writings, 
edited by Biancamaria Fontana, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 (1819), pp. 308-28. 
15 See Weber Max, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics” [1919] in Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 316. 
16 Rousseau, "Of the Social Contract”, p. 114. 
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mandate, “because it is true that a free nation should neither chain future generations nor turn itself 
into a slave; the first duty of a free people is to delegate its freedom to nobody [from which it follows 
that] this right [sovereignty] as well as all other rights are imprescriptible and inalienable”.17  
While the debate between democracy and representation was in its philosophical core a debate about 
how to understand the idea of freedom in modern political and socio-economic conditions, it is 
important to observe that it took place in circumstances where the group of people entitled to have 
say in the choice of representatives was extremely restricted.  For a very long time only wealthy males 
were qualified to take part in elections.  But even with the expansion of the franchise, the debate on 
the compatibility between democracy and representation continues in another form.  For some 
authors, the expansion of the franchise together with the emergence and consolidation of mass 
parties open up new channels for articulating popular sovereignty in a way that links institutionalised 
politics to the demands of individuals active in civil society.18 For others, however, the extent to which 
liberal politics remains dominated by elections and the mechanisms of representative-selection 
implies that the avenues for an authentic realisation of the general will are extremely limited.19 As 
Schumpeter starkly put it in a classical definition that has attracted much criticism, far from being a 
system where selected individuals put the people’s will into action, representative democracy is 
merely "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions, in which individuals acquire 
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote".20  
This dualism however may be too stark. Whether and to what extent partisanship and political 
mobilisation beyond electoral moments can truly represent the people’s will depends on the 
constraints of particular socio-economic, legal and political systems and the mechanisms for the 
continuous involvement of ordinary people that these make available. 
 
3. Partisanship and recall 
 
Elsewhere we have argued that a conception of partisanship, understood as an associative political 
practice intended to promote and support political commitment, is essential to reviving the ideal of 
self-government at the heart of the radical democratic tradition.21 What distinguishes this democratic 
conception of partisanship from its liberal counterparts is the extent to which it rests on a normatively 
significant distinction between factions and parties, whereby the former are seen as promoting self-
interested principles and aims whereas the latter seek to realise principles and policies that everyone 
could in principle share and could be generally and reciprocally justified.  This implies an analysis of 
partisan activity irreducible to what political parties are most commonly associated with, i.e. the 
development of public policy proposals and the selection of candidates for election. It requires looking 
beyond the party as a formal organisation and considering the benefits and obligations entailed by a 
type of political association that promotes and sustains political commitment over the long term.  
                                                          
17 Cited in Lucia Rubinelli, Constituent Power and the modern state. A history of the theory and practice of popular 
power (PhD thesis defended at Cambridge University, 2016), p. 50. 
18 See on this issue especially Urbinati, Nadia, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
19 Manin, The Principles of Representative Government. 
20 Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Routledge [1943] 1994), p. 76. Some of 
Schumpeter’s insights were anticipated by Condorcet whose constitutional project implicitly criticised Siéyès and 
advocated recall mechanisms while also emphasising the risks of a new despotism of representatives. 
21 White and Ypi, The Meaning of Partisanship. 
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But the relationship between partisanship (understood as a mode of political activity that involves 
ordinary people committed to certain generalisable principles and aims) and parties (as the 
institutional reflection of their will) requires further examination. One difficult question concerns the 
extent to which institutional constraints enable or reinforce that relation. Whether democratic 
partisanship actually realises the value of self-government depends very much on the modalities of 
political participation and the ongoing involvement that parties (and the political systems by which 
they are constrained) grant to activists.  
While the value of self-government is typically celebrated in every liberal democracy, the relationship 
between representatives and the represented tends to be one of independence rather than ongoing 
scrutiny. The two most obvious, and historically debated, ways of preserving the sovereignty of the 
people while delegating decision-making power to representatives are the imperative mandate and 
the discretionary revocability of representatives (recall mechanisms). Yet neither of these mechanisms 
is deeply entrenched in the institutions of contemporary liberal democracy. Despite the consistent 
effort of radical political movements to incorporate such measures in their projects of institutional 
reform, their mobilisation has largely been unsuccessful. The result is that contemporary systems 
inherit much the same hostility to recall mechanisms as their 19th-century counterparts.22   
For the champions of radical democracy, the emphasis on recall mechanisms was part of a more 
general struggle to realise the democratic ideal of self-government which the liberal analysis of 
representation seemed to have left to one side. In commenting on the Paris Commune’s measures to 
establish a system of permanent recall for members of the Council, Marx echoed Rousseau’s criticism 
of representation. “Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was 
to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in 
Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and 
managers in his business”. As Marx puts it, “it is well known that companies, like individuals, in matters 
of real business generally know how to put the right man in the right place, and, if they for once make 
a mistake, to redress it promptly. On the other hand, nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of 
the Commune than to supersede universal suffrage by hierarchic investiture”.23  
Marx’s allusion to hierarchic investiture emphasises the pre-modern nature of a conception of political 
representation that seeks to exclude the masses from important moments of public decision-making. 
Ultimately, it is a critique of the elitist divide in liberal politics that the current system of political 
representation entrenches without being able solve. Political scientists often refer to the different 
ways of thinking about the relationship between representatives and represented in terms of a 
“trustee” versus “delegate” model. The former seeks to preserve the independence of representatives 
from the people, the latter suggests that the role of elected representatives just is that of articulating 
the voice of people in relevant institutional sites to which they would otherwise have no access.24 
Recall mechanisms are an important part of the process through which elected representatives remain 
accountable to partisans.  They provide institutional guarantees that articulate the political 
commitments in executive channels of political will formation. 
Parties play an essential mediating function between the plurality of interests and principles 
characterising civil society and the unity of purpose required when institutions make laws that are 
                                                          
22 See Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, p. 163. 
23 See Marx, Karl, "The Civil War in France." [1871] in Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
p. 588. 
24 For the distinction between the two see, Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1972), esp. chs. 6 and 7. 
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coercively binding for all.  Parties give definition and political focus to normative principles, connecting 
them on the one hand to the intuitions of ordinary people, and on the other to the exercise of 
legislative and executive power.  They aim to develop explicitly political identities, irreducible to the 
concerns of a sectional grouping, and towards which citizens may orientate themselves reflexively 
based on an evaluation of the associated objectives.25  Rather than just aggregations of societal 
interests, they are agents fundamental to the exercise of popular sovereignty.26  
But how effectively parties and partisanship contribute to the active exercise of popular sovereignty 
depends in crucial part on the availability of scrutiny mechanisms that link the views of partisans to 
those expressed by their elected officials. Recall mechanisms empower partisans beyond the limited 
timing and mobilisation typically concentrated in elections, ensuring that their voice is continuously 
heard. While a vibrant public sphere also gives partisans a vehicle through which the activities of public 
officials can be assessed and criticised, recall mechanisms are more effective in linking the process of 
selection to the purposes and ends that activists hope that their elected representatives will promote. 
They are essential in renewing what a collective association stands for and to reaffirm the political 
project on whose behalf partisans remain continuously engaged in politics.  
Recall mechanisms are especially important in moments of crisis in liberal representation, when 
citizen apathy and a perceived divide between masses and elites are often cited as reasons for a 
decline in mass parties and the traditional channels of popular will-formation.27 In some ways, our 
current predicament is similar to that of Siéyès and Burke: oligarchic and technocratic decision-making 
is on the rise while the vast majority of the public remain alienated from parliamentary politics. But 
while at the origin of liberal representation there may have been affinities between the class interests 
of representatives and those of the voting subset, due to the selective criteria for voting, the spectrum 
of diversity between representatives and represented based on class background, cultural 
identification, social orientation and so on, is now much wider. In this context, the gap between 
representatives and the represented must be urgently closed. Otherwise there is a real risk that the 
mass of effectively disenfranchised citizens permanently drifts away from traditional channels of 
representation to the more demagogic and populist forms of activism whose recent rise has also been 
widely documented.28 
A distinction can be made between those forms of partisan recall that map onto the rhythms of 
electoral politics and those that can be activated by partisans at any point in time.  Mandatory 
reselection is of the first kind.  The practice entails that, should an incumbent parliamentarian hope to 
be re-elected at the next election, they must first submit to a competitive nomination process within 
their party.  Should the party’s selectors vote in favour of another candidate, the incumbent 
representative is effectively recalled.  The practice synchronises with the electoral cycle, and can be 
seen as part of the more general effort to renew the electoral campaign. Here it is only in the run-up 
to elections that sitting representatives are challenged to make a new case for their re-election.  
Deselection is activated on an ad hoc basis, outside the time-structures of electoral institutions.  
Representatives are continuously scrutinised and can be recalled at any point, for example by initiating 
a petition process and deselection campaign.  The party membership to whom these representatives 
                                                          
25 Cf. Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogies, pp. 36ff. 
26 See on this Wolkenstein, Fabio, “Agents of Popular Sovereignty” Political Theory, online early 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591718786232 (2018); White & Ypi, The Meaning of Partisanship, ch. 1; White, 
Jonathan and Ypi, Lea (2010) Rethinking the modern prince: partisanship and the democratic ethos. Political 
Studies, 58 (4). pp. 809-828. 
27 See the excellent analysis in Mair, Peter, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy (London: 
Verso, 2013). 
28 See the discussion in White, Jonathan, Politics of Last Resort, chapter 6. 
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are accountable can seek to recall them whenever their conduct is felt to be at odds with the aims or 
standards associated with the party.  Recall happens not on a periodic basis, in other words, but 
whenever a certain threshold is crossed, e.g. when a certain number of signatures has been collected. 
Both are potential ways of strengthening participatory democracy through the channel of political 
parties.  Mandatory reselection can be seen as part of the process of preparing for elections and is 
generally considered less controversial.  It conforms to the general principle that representation is 
time-bound and needs periodic renewal.  Clearly, there may be moments when this form of party-
based representation may be said to clash with the political representation of citizens more generally.  
Some constituents content with an incumbent MP and keen to support their re-election may feel 
disenfranchised should that MP’s party decline to nominate the individual again.  Such objections are 
arguably not forceful though.  To the extent that a candidate for election wishes to be associated with 
a political party and the programmatic agenda it embodies, it is logical that the party should be able 
to assess their actions in this light and recall them where appropriate.  Likewise, should they avail 
themselves of the resources of the party, accepting the campaigning assistance of party activists to 
help them get elected, it is logical that the party be in a position to evaluate their record and decide 
whether to renew its support.  Moreover, those who are not reselected by their party may often be 
able to stand as independent candidates for election instead.  The possibility of citizen representation 
unmediated by a political party is thus retained. 
But while mandatory reselection is fairly accommodating of general criticisms to the recall mechanism, 
deselection is important precisely because of the radical degree to which it potentially empowers 
ordinary citizens with relation to their elected representatives. It is here that the advantages of recall 
mechanisms based on parties are likely to reveal themselves most sharply.  Whereas candidate 
(re)selection campaigns at election time can be (and sometimes are) conducted outside parties, albeit 
with all the attendant risks of personalised contests, recall mechanisms outside the electoral cycle 
face significant collective-action problems.  Their initiation by individual citizens is challenging, given 
the thresholds of support needed.  (Granting opposition parties a significant role in initiating such 
processes meanwhile creates a capacity liable to be abused.) Therefore, while mandatory selection 
should certainly be applauded, it is also worth exploring de-selection in more detail to see whether 
some of the standard objections to it are sustainable and to judge whether the model is ultimately 
defensible. 
Some of the contemporary parties to embrace such methods – notably “digital” or “platform” parties 
on the model of Movimento 5 Stelle – have not always done so with great success.  With rather weakly 
defined ideological commitments, other than their enthusiasm for participatory methods, and 
reluctant to adopt the organisational structures that might underpin a more defined programmatic 
identity, they have arguably used recall mechanisms in an unpredictable and reckless fashion.29  But 
however problematic such recent experiences, the mechanisms in question are in principle adoptable 
also by parties with a more clearly defined normative project and more willing to retain structures of 
hierarchy and representation.  How defensible is deselection in such contexts? 
 
4. Objections to Deselection 
 
One of the most common criticisms of the practice of deselecting representatives concerns the 
pressure that the threat of deselection puts on public officials, who may become dependent on public 
                                                          
29 Gerbaudo, The Digital Party, p.135. 
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opinion or attempt to second-guess the will of citizens to the point of failing to exhibit leadership on 
matters of principle. Call this the perverse incentives objection. While this objection is on the surface 
plausible, it is premised on a certain understanding of elected officials as people who have inherently 
more skills, leadership or principled commitment than the people they ought to represent.30 In other 
words, it is premised on accepting an asymmetry between professional politicians with greater skills 
and knowledge and ordinary members of the public who may lack the same abilities or understanding 
of the constraints of political institutions. The implicit historical reference is here not the democratic 
forum of equals but the Roman division between the higher magistrates and the people: while the 
people could elect magistrates, they could not themselves be magistrates.31 On this alternative model, 
the worry is that a constant fear of sanctions by partisans on the ground might create perverse 
incentives that force representatives to self-censor or fail to make decisions that would displease their 
supporters, even when the latter may be warranted. 
There are several replies one can give to this objection. The first, more abstract one, is to question 
whether this degree of professionalisation of politics is itself intrinsically desirable. If there are certain 
substantive as well as formal conditions that ought to be met in order to enable all citizens to be self-
governing, e.g. conditions to do with the distribution of skills and knowledge required to be involved 
in politics effectively, or with the degree of familiarity with how institutions work, surely the right 
response is to distribute these skills and assets more widely rather than to isolate those who have 
them from those who do not. Just as elections and the choice of government should not be considered 
in isolation from the more general partisan practices and political engagement that precedes them, 
the practice of recall should not be considered in isolation from an ongoing process of deliberation 
between representatives and represented, geared to the political education of each.32  
This is in fact precisely where politics differs from other realms of life in which a division of labour or 
an asymmetric distribution of decision-making capacity may be warranted. It is why politics is precisely 
not a profession like any other. Politicians are not like doctors, in whom we believe “whether they 
cure us with our consent or without it, by cutting or burning or applying some other painful 
treatment”.33 When one has a heart problem, a cardiologist may be needed to examine the heart and 
fix the problem; one can trust no other claim to expertise, and certainly not one’s own. But elected 
representatives have no particular fields of expertise. They are ordinary citizens with a history of 
mobilisation, campaigning or policy-making, and with particular profiles singled out as suitable to 
represent their fellow-partisans.  Even if they have a privileged epistemic viewpoint with regard to 
some aspect of decision-making (they may come from a particular career path with relevant exposure 
to certain areas of institutional politics, or they may belong to particular minorities that give them a 
valuable epistemic vantage point when it comes to particular issues) these will typically be insufficient 
to cover all the aspects of decision-making and spheres of law with regard to which they will be called 
to make decisions.  
Therefore, while the doctor’s claim to be able to fix one’s heart better than oneself can in general be 
taken at face value, there are reasons to doubt professional politicians’ claim to expertise on all 
particular applications of political decision-making. And even when someone does have an unusual 
                                                          
30 See Bowler, "Recall and Representation: Arnold Schwarzenegger Meets Edmund Burke," for this objection. 
31 See for a discussion of this point, Manin, Principles of Representative Government, pp. 46-7.  
32 On the role of political education for ends that are neither depoliticised nor reducible to the immediacy of 
partisan conflict, see Einaudi, Luigi, “Conoscere per deliberare” (1954) in Einaudi, Luigi, Prediche inutili (Torino: 
Einaudi, 1964) and Bobbio, Norberto, “Intellettuali e classe politica” (1995) in Bobbio, Norberto, Il dubbio e la 
scelta. Intellettuali e potere nella societa’ contemporanea (Rome: Carocci, 1993). 
33 Plato, Statesman, trans. Rowe, Christopher (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999), 293b. 
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knowledge and ability to navigate and respond to a broad and complex array of political questions, 
this may be only as a result of the experience accumulated through years of public office. In the latter 
case, from a democratic perspective, surely the right attitude is to see this as an unfortunate 
implication of insufficient rotation in office rather than as something intrinsically desirable that should 
be replicated. 
The second important point to make in response to the incentives objection is that the extent to which 
professional politicians make independent decisions and exercise leadership given the institutional 
constraints is vastly exaggerated. It is true that in the absence of recall mechanisms, professional 
politicians representing particular parties can safely ignore the views of their constituents, barring 
election time. But it is usually very difficult for them to ignore the views of bureaucrats, policy-makers, 
lobbyists, business people, the media, civil society associations, and polling agencies. Such influence 
and pressure usually goes much beyond the timing of elections. Given these constraints, the idea that 
elected representatives would exercise their judgment and leadership if it were not for the influence 
of constituents is largely a myth. In liberal market societies, political influence is usually proportionate 
to the power of money. For radical democrats, the question is how to make sure that influence is at 
least balanced so that the decisions of politicians (including the compromises they are asked to make 
in this environment) approximates as much as possible the views and judgment of the ordinary people 
who elect them. Given incentives are never pure, recall mechanisms should be seen as a balancing 
rather than disruptive force. 
A second objection to recall mechanisms is concerned not so much with the system of incentives 
within which elected representatives operate as with the efficiency of recall campaigns. Call this the 
efficiency objection. The critique here is that recall mechanisms run the risk of distracting sitting MPs 
from their daily task of representing constituents by forcing them to confront fellow partisans when 
the latter see their work as insufficiently linked to their political commitments. This concern is 
probably also over-stated. Firstly, there are many kinds of obligation that might distract 
representatives from their daily activities, including their obligations to family, friends or institutions 
other than their own parties. The point of taking up representative responsibilities (and the desirability 
of limiting such responsibilities in time) is that one is prepared to navigate these increased burdens. 
Where the occupation of office is limited in time, elected representatives know that such increased 
burdens are only provisional.  
The second, more important part of the answer to the efficiency objection, is that not all recall 
campaigns risk reducing the efficiency of representation: they might also increase it. Much depends 
on how recall measures are organised, where they fit in the schedule of representatives and what 
constraints are in place with regard to how they are conducted, with what frequency, and especially 
what tone should govern the debate around them. Where recall debates have proven weary and 
destructive, the fault has been not so much with recall campaigns as such as with the highly 
personalised or negative tone of the campaign, with the absence of sustained principled debate on 
particular issues, with the lack of working channels of communication between representatives and 
citizens, and so on. In general, negative recall campaigns have been associated with mutual distrust 
and a destructive tendency in the exchange between representatives and represented, where charges 
of corruption are coupled with personal insults resulting in the further alienation of one group from 
the other. The problem here, however, relates not to recall mechanisms as such as to the lack of 
discipline and of a culture of respect amongst activists. There is no reason why more constraints on 
the process, as well as a different arrangement of the procedures and timing of recall campaigns, could 
not result in a more constructive contribution.  
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A final objection concerns the relationship between the role of fellow-partisans and constituents in 
recall mechanisms. So far, our discussion has mainly been limited to the importance of deselection 
and mandatory reselection procedures as they apply within a political party. But as noted in regard to 
mandatory reselection, one might say that elected representatives have obligations both to fellow-
party members, whose views they represent and who campaign on their behalf, and also to 
constituents at large, to the nation or “the people” whose sovereignty they articulate.  One might call 
this the constituency objection. 
The question of how to navigate that tension is a difficult one. However, it is important to point out 
that the problem of how to represent both fellow-partisans and their commitments to certain 
principles and aims and how to represent constituents who may not agree with the principles of the 
winning party is not specific to the debate around recall. It is a tension intrinsic to how liberal 
institutions realise the idea of representation. Nothing about this tension raises further difficulties for 
recall mechanisms over and above the more general problem that “no man can serve two masters”, 
that parties cannot be both representative of members and of constituents without some tension, as 
some political scientists have put it. 34 The more specific answer when it comes to the issue of recall 
mechanisms has to be seen in light of that more general problem.  
The key point, once again, is that in liberal democratic societies the election of representatives is 
intrinsically connected to the party system, and it is on the basis of particularly party manifestos and 
programmes that elected representative are voted into office. Given this basic model, it is crucial to 
ensure that incumbents are responsive to members with regard to how they act on the basis of the 
party programme, and that the latter retain a say when compromises are required or difficult choices 
need to be made. Recall mechanisms that enable members to deselect sitting MPs who fail to properly 
connect the party on the ground with the party in office are a crucial step to ensure that the principles 
and aims consolidated in the party programme combine democratic support with executive efficiency.  
Such a model does not discourage or undermine the participation of ordinary citizens: it encourages 
that participation in the form of partisan engagement, requiring that their commitments be mediated 
by their affiliation with partisan associations. When citizens profoundly disagree with the values and 
principles of the public officials that represent them, it is because they profoundly disagree with the 
values and principles of the party that wins the election. The way to challenge that outcome and 
source that disagreement is through partisan affiliation. Recall mechanisms do nothing to aggravate 
that tension; they simply ensure that a greater number of people can take responsibility for the 
outcomes that follow. The issue of how to devise recall procedures that enable partisan activists to 
exercise control on representatives, while also preventing a small minority from hijacking democratic 
norms and justified majoritarian principles of decision-making, remains a crucial challenge but need 




Democracy is in crisis, it is often said. Those who lament this state of affairs link it to the crisis of 
representation, the fact that few people trust political elites, and that even fewer are inclined to turn 
up and vote, or that when they do they end up voting for politicians who undermine rather than 
                                                          
34 See for one discussion Katz, Richard, “No man can serve two masters: Party politicians, party members, 
citizens and principal–agent models of democracy”, Party Politics 20/2 (2014), 183-193. 
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support democratic values. If all that is true, it is imperative to seek to restore trust in the ability of 
institutional politics to respond to the concerns of ordinary people, to fill the gap between citizens 
and political elites.  
Strengthening recall mechanisms is an important step in that direction. Consolidating mechanisms of 
direct democracy is crucial to ensuring ordinary citizens can take political responsibility, seeing 
themselves as agents and not only recipients of political decision-making. That such mechanisms 
should be part of the organisational structure of political parties, and not just of citizen-representative 
relations more generally, seems important in two respects.  First, if long-standing oligarchic tendencies 
within parties are one aspect of the democratic weakness and alienation in question, it makes sense 
to see the empowerment of partisans vis-à-vis their leaders as one necessary component in any wider 
effort to revitalise democracy.  Strengthening partisan recall mechanisms is one way to counter the 
failings of existing parties. Second, and more positively, it is when channelled through the party form 
that recall mechanisms have particular potential to augment representative democracy.  Such 
mechanisms need those who can initiate them and connect them to shared normative commitments. 
Embedding them in an associational context defined by shared ideas counters the risk that they are 
used in highly personalised ways to punish the character failings of individuals, or that – on account 
of the same risk – their application is restricted to the most egregious cases of corruption, and thus 
rendered of little relevance to day-to-day politics.  It is as a wider and principled check on political 
power, channelled through clearly-defined parties, that mechanisms for recalling representatives 
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